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Capital Investment in Southeastern Asia
and the Philippines
By HELMUT G. CALLIS
SOUTHEASTERN ASIA representsa problem of international rela-
tions in the broadest sense of the term.
This problem was, and still is, to in-
corporate an underdeveloped area of
great national wealth into our inter-
dependent world of trade and industry.
The peoples of southeastern Asia had
not had experience with introducing,
operating, and organizing large-scale
production in agriculture and industry.
For this reason foreign entrepreneur in-
vestment-the enterprises, mines, and
plantations of foreign business men-
became the connecting link between
southeastern Asia and the outside world.
In forging this link, white and yellow
men were brought into positions of eco-
nomic authority among peoples of dif-
ferent race and culture. Whatever plans
may be drawn up after the war, a
knowledge of the prewar situation will
be needed. To promote such knowl-
edge is the intent of the following sur-
vey of capital investment in southeast-
ern Asia.
TABLE 1-ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN (EXCLUDING CHINESE) INVESTMENTS IN
SOUTHEASTERN ASIA, LATEST DATE 1
(In million U. S. dollars)
UNITED STATES INVESTMENTS
The role played by United States
capital in southeastern Asia is relatively
modest. The total American invest-
ment in the whole area was estimated
to amount to $800,000,000 in 1936.~
The great bulk of these holdings is en-
trepreneurial 8 capital, and the economic
basis of most of them can be found in
opportunities for import and export
trade with the United States.
The Philippines
America’s economic stake in the
Philippines is only $200,000,000, or not
much more than 1 per cent of total
1 H. G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast
Asia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1942), p. 108. In this survey table, the ex-
change rates chosen were the averages for the
years in which the respective investments were
made.
2 All sums of money in this article are ex-
pressed in United States dollars unless other-
wise designated.
3 Entrepreneur investments are also called di-
rect or business investments. They stand in
contrast to rentier or portfolio investment, such
as government bonds, and so forth.
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United States investments in the whole
world, and approximately 25 per cent
of her total investments in southeastern
Asia.4
United States holdings of Philippine
Government bonds is by far the most
important item in rentier holdings in
the Islands. The latest available fig-
ures place the United States holdings of
government and government-guaranteed
bonds at 37.5 million United States dol-
lars for the year ending December 31,
1939.5 The holdings of bonds formed
only about 20 per cent of the total
American investment before the present
war, and have been rapidly declining.
The United States Tariff Commis-
sion in 1935 estimated the total value
of American entrepreneurial capital to
approximate $163,500,000.6 Of this
amount, almost $111,350,000 repre-
sented the book value of machinery
and equipment. The rest were com-
paratively small investments in land
and buildings, and current assets. In
1935 American capital played an im-
portant role in 189 different concerns.
Seventy-eight per cent of the’ total
American business capital was invested
in mining, utilities, sugar centrals, plan-
tations, and merchandising.
With regard to industries based on
agricultural products, the strength of
American capital lay in the control of
mills and other processing machinery.
In the sugar industry American capital
was said to control about one-third of
the sugar centrals, with an amount of
$22,400,000. In coconut, rubber, and
abaca plantations, American capital had
a share of $19,700,000. With invest-
ments of $5,500,000 in mills and re-
fineries for the processing of coconuts,
the United States was far ahead of
other nationalities.
Mining has become the most impor-
tant item in the last decade. United
States holdings in this field were valued
at $37,900,000,1 with ownership of
about 60 per cent of the total gold re-
serve of the area. In addition, the out-
put of base metals such as iron, copper,
chromium, and manganese has increased
by leaps and bounds in recent years,&dquo;
American capital playing a leading role
in most of these new mining fields.
The great concerns included in the
public utility classification were all
American-controlled and represented a
capital of $31,850,000.9 If holdings in
transportation and water systems are
added, Americans controlled almost 44
per cent of public service enterprises in
the Philippines in 1938.~0
Further details on the distribution of
United States capital in the area may
be found in Table 2.
TABLE 2-AMERICAN BUSINESS INVESTMENTS
IN THE PHILIPPINES AS OF JUNE 30, 1935 11
(Thousands U. S. dollars)
4 United States Tariff Commission, Philip-
pine Trade Report No. 118, 1937, pp. 189 ff.
5 United States Department of Commerce,
The Balance of International Payments of the
United States (Washington, 1940), p. 80.
6 United States Tariff Commission, op. cit.,
p. 191.
7 United States Department of Commerce,
World Economic Review, 1936, p. 264.
8 Report of the Bureau of Insular Affairs on
Philippine Farm Industries revised as of July
31, 1935, and reviewed in the Manila Bulletin,
May 8, 1936.
9 United States Tariff Commission, op. cit.,
p. 192.
10 "Utilities in the Philippines," New York
Times, March 13, 1938.




In 1935, American holdings of East
Indian dollar bonds amounted to the
small sum of $24,400,000, consisting of
long-term corporation bonds.12
As to business investments, the Ameri-
cans, like the British, showed a defi-
nite preference for staple commodities
of strategic importance, especially rub-
ber and oil. The United States Rub-
ber Company, the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, and the Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company, Inc., have
gone in for large plantation holdings
in the area. In 1935, American in-
vestments in rubber were valued at
$2 7,500,000.13
Before the present war Americans con-
trolled approximately 40 per cent of the
oil interests in the Dutch colony through
the Standard Oil Company of New Jer-
sey and the Socony Vacuum Corporation.
Their subsidiary, the Standard-Vacuum
Oil Company was reported to own
properties in the Indies of no less than
$70,000,000 in 1936. A four-million-
dollar plant for the manufacture of high-
octane aviation gasoline had been com-
pleted before the outbreak of the present
war, by a subsidiary of the Standard Oil
Company.
American trading and banking houses
bring the total of American capital in the
Netherlands Indies close to $100,000,-
000.15
British Malaya
In 1936 the United States Department
of Commerce counted a total of seven-
teen American companies with holdings
of $23,700,000 in British Malaya. Rub-
ber plantations and organizations for
purchasing and shipping crude rubber
were the most important. Tin mines
were operated by American interests and,
along with the distribution of petroleum
products, made up the bulk of the re-
mainder.16
Indo-China, Thailand, Burma
Only eight American companies with
holdings of about $3,300,000 are doing
business in Indo-China and Thailand. 17
In Burma, the American Socony Vac-
uum Corporation had an interest in the
oil distribution business, though the
holdings were small.
. BRITISH INVESTMENTS
Until 1941, British capital had a posi-
tion of uncontested preponderance in
three key areas of southeastern Asia:
Malaya, Burma, and Thailand. British
influence was dominant, not only in trade
and industry, but also in the exploita-
tion of strategic raw materials.
British Malaya
In 193 the public indebtedness of
the colony stood at approximately 105,-
000,000 Straits dollars (about 60,000,-
000 United States dollars). Not less
than two-thirds of the government bonds
were in the hands of British subjects,
many of them residents in the colony.
Great Britain, the metropolitan power,
was-with more than 70 per cent of the
total-the leading nation in business in-
vestments.
Up to the end of 1941 the greater
part of the rubber industry and, of
course, the rubber market were con-
trolled by the British, with an invest-
12 Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in Inter-
national Investments (Washington, 1938), p.
664.
13 Cleona Lewis, op. cit., p. 590.
14 Incorporated in Delaware, September 7,
1933, as a consolidation of the Far Eastern
businesses, properties, and assets of the Stand-
ard Oil Company (N. J.) and of the Socony
Vacuum Corporation.
15 See also A. Vandenbosch, "The Nether-
lands Colonial Balance Sheet," Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, Jan. 1938, p. 329.
16 United States Department of Commerce,
American Direct Investments in Foreign Coun-
tries (Washington, 1929), p. 27.
17 Ibid., p. 16.
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ment of roughly $200,000,000. Com-
panies domiciled in the British Empire
owned 1,100,000 acres planted with rub-
ber. With regard to other agricultural
crops, the British had considerable inter-
ests in coconut and oil-palm plantations.
In all fields of mining activity, British
capital played the chief role. The hold-
ings of British tin-dredging companies
amounted to about $50,000,000 in 1936.
In the Federated Malay States alone,
about forty British companies were en-
gaged in tin dredging. The British-
owned Pahang Consolidated Company’s
mine was one of the largest lode tin
mines in the world. In tin smelting the
British &dquo;Straits Trading Company&dquo; and
the equally British ‘‘Eastern Smelting
Company&dquo; had a virtual monopoly. Up
to the conquest of Singapore, the British
Malayan companies retained control of
the greater part of the world’s tin smelt-
ing. Coal was also mined in substantial
quantities in Malaya, and, more impor-
tant, as a rare strategic mineral, tung-
sten. The bulk of this ore came from a
single British-owned mine at Pulai in
Perak, its large production making the
Federated Malay States the fourth larg-
est producer of tungsten ores in the
world.
Burma
More than 90 per cent of the total
investments in Burma were British or
British-controlled. This was partly to
be explained by Britain’s strong mili-
tary and economic interest in Burma’s
great wealth in strategically indispen-
sable products-mineral oil, metals, and
some rubber. Two-thirds of the foreign
capital working in Burma before its con-
quest was invested in these key products.
In 1939 British holdings of govern-
ment and industrial securities amounted
to about $9,000,000, three-fourths of
which consisted of railroad and indus-
trial bonds. The rest was made up of
two sterling loans of the City and the
Port of Rangoon. In contrast to busi-
ness investments, these holdings were
very small indeed.
Burma is the world’s greatest producer
of teakwood, and exported more than
$13,000,000 of it in 1937-38. The total
investments of the Burmese lumber in-
dustry were, conservatively valued, about
$15,000,000 and represented almost ex-
clusively British holdings.
The rubber-growing district is com-
paratively small in Burma. The British
owned 35,000 acres in rubber planta-
tions, which comprised the majority of
Burmese estates over 100 acres in size.
Altogether, British holdings in Burmese
plantations, even if investments in tea
and other planting companies were in-
cluded, hardly exceeded $5,000,000.
Concessions for the exploitation of
Burmese oil fields were granted only to
British concerns. As a result, the ex-
traction and distribution of Burmese
petroleum was almost exclusively in the
hands of three great British-controlled
corporations. The total of British hold-
ings in Burmese oil before the present
conflict might well be valued at roughly
$72,000,000.
In the field of mining, a few great
British corporations were predominant.
By far the most important was the
Burma Corporation, Ltd. Besides hav-
ing been one of the largest silver and
lead producers in the world, thig com-
pany also extracted considerable quanti-
ties of other ores. There are two other
metals in the production of which Burma
ranks among the main world producers-
tin and tungsten. Since 1928, produc-
tion of these two strategic minerals has
doubled and tripled, respectively. Brit-
ish and British-controlled holdings in
Burmese mining amounted to almost
$70,000,000 according to recent esti-
mates.
Navigation on the Irrawaddy River
was controlled by the Irrawaddy Flotilla
and Airways Company, a private British
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concern. The railways were taken over
by the colonial government of Burma
after the separation of Burma from In-
dia in 1937. Altogether, British hold-
ings in railroads, river navigation, and
tramways amounted to approximately
$28,000,000, more than half of which
was government investment.18
Thailand (Siam)
In 1937-38 Thailand’s total outstand-
ing foreign debt was about $34,000,000.
The bonds covering this sum were almost
exclusively in the hands of British sub-
jects.
The bulk of the foreign capital ($90,-
000,000 in 1938) which entered the
country for the development of its im-
portant raw material resources, especially
-tin, timber, and rubber, was British
capital.
Thailand, with Burma and Indo-
China, supplies the world’s teak. Over
70 per cent of her total area (200,234
square miles) is still covered by virgin
forests. Eighty-eight per cent of the
capital in the timber industry was in
foreign hands. Two-thirds of the teak
holdings were purely British, and of the
six principal companies four were Brit-
ish.
Thailand produces only 0.5 per cent
of the world’s rubber, in contrast to
Malaya’s 53 per cent. There were only
a few large foreign-owned plantations
which produced rubber exclusively. 
’
British preponderance in the impor-
tant field of tin mining showed itself in
the fact that the Thai Chamber of Mines
at Puket was largely of British member-
ship. The majority of the tin-dredging
companies were Australian and United
Kingdom concerns.
The Netherlands Indies
The Dutch &dquo;share the wealth&dquo; policy
in the Netherlands Indies towards na-
tions with parallel interests in trade and
politics brought the British into posses-
sion of considerable interests in almost
every profitable field, including those of
strategic importance such as oil and rub-
ber. While the British share in govern-
ment bonds had shrunk to a rather negli-
gible amount before the present war, it
was considerable in the field of entre-
preneur investment, where it amounted
to almost $200,000,000.
British holdings in estate agriculture
may be valued as having been approxi-
mately not much below $80,000,000.
Almost two-thirds of this sum was in-
vested in rubber, but there were also
large interests in sugar, coffee, and tea.19
In the Royal Dutch-Shell combine, the
British held 40 per cent of the capital
of the two main oil companies: the Ba-
tavian Company and the Anglo-Saxon
Petroleum Company. For 1937, the
British stake in oil production was val-
ued at about $132,500,000.
The Philippines
In the Philippines, American and
Japanese competition has been a double
deterrent for the British investor. The
total British holdings in the Philippines
have been placed at no more than about
$45,000,000 in 1935. About half of
this sum represented holdings in Manila
Railroad bonds. The remainder was
business capital invested in two British
banks, a lumber concession, and import
and export houses.
DUTCH INVESTMENTS
Dutch capital in southeastern Asia
was rather inconspicuous except in the
Dutch colonial territory.
18 Joint Stock Companies in British India,
Commercial Intelligence Department, Delhi,
1940.
19 Annual report of the Handelsvereenigung
of Medan, The East Coast of Sumatra in 1937
(Medan, 1938), pp. 196, 197, quoted in Van
der Valk’s report for the Geneva Conference
on Direct Investments, 1939.
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The Netherlands Indies
To understand the importance of the
Netherlands Indies to Dutch economy,
it is helpful to realize that before the
conquest of the Netherlands, one-fifth to
one-tenth of her entire population de-
pended either directly or indirectly on
the commerce or the industries of the
Netherlands East Indies.
Rentier investments, mainly govern-
ment bonds, represented more than one-
third of the total foreign investments in
the area. In 1940 the public debt, in-
cluding that of municipalities and re-
gencies, was over $585,000,000. Indus-
trial debentures were valued at about
$125,000,000. The Dutch held the great
majority of these rentier investments,
but not more than some 70 per cent of
the entrepreneur investments.
Side by side with the private business-
man, the government had an outstanding
position as investor in and owner of
many of the largest enterprises of the
islands. Altogether, Dutch private and
government capital in the Indies added
up to about $1,400,000,000.
The Dutch share in the production of
agricultural export commodities was par-
ticularly large, reaching approximately
$800,000,000. Rubber and sugar ac-
counted in about equal parts for almost
two-thirds of this amount. In coffee and
tobacco the Dutch interest, reaching
about $80,000,000, was by far the larg-
est among those of foreign nationals.
The monopolistic manufacture of quinine
and other cinchona derivatives was ex-
clusively, and the palm-oil industry pre-
dominantly, in Dutch hands. Teak for-
ests were all state-owned and the lumber
industry was a government monopoly.
Far above all other items was the in-
terest of the Dutch in mineral oil pro-
duction, where they held first place
among all other nationals. Their hold-
ings in this strategic raw material were,
before the present conflict, estimated to
be about $265,000,000. Their holdings
in oil refining are included in this figure.
~ Minerals, too, were of major impor-
tance in Dutch capital investments.
Most of the principal tin mines were
government-owned. After 1937 other
strategic raw materials, such as bauxite
and nickel, began to attract attention
from private investors.
A total of about $185,000,000 of
Dutch business investments in communi-
cations and utilities placed this category
next to agriculture and minerals. The
chief items were privately owned, though
there were government-owned as well as
private railroads and street cars.
British Malaya
Total Dutch holdings in Malaya were
not much below American investments.
The Dutch had no investments in rub-
ber, but concentrated more on other agri-
cultural crops and investments in trade
and banking.
FRENCH INVESTMENTS
French capital in southeastern Asia
was concentrated in Indo-China and
played only a minor role in other parts
of the area.
French Indo-China
Inspired by Albert Sarraut’s idea of
the investment policy of mise en valeur,
the French Government authorized large
funds for loans between 1931 and 1938.
These government loans, whose total
outstanding value in 1937 was about
$65,000,000, were intended to be used
mainly for public works, such as railroad
and highway construction, irrigation,
sanitation, and other projects.2° Indus-
trial debentures amounted to only $4,-
500,000 during 1931-36.
On an inventory basis we believe that
it is justifiable to place the profit-yielding
assets of French companies in Indo-
20 H. I. Priestley, France Overseas (New
York, 1938), p. 240.
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China at close to $300,000,000 in 1938.
At that time entrepreneur investments
showed a four-to-one preponderance over
rentier investments.
Thanks to the rapid development of
rubber production in the last two dec-
ades, agriculture held the first place with
about 33 per cent of total holdings. In
1936 an area of almost 314,000 acres of
rubber plantations was administered by
French colonial corporations. The value
of French rubber holdings before the war
has been estimated to be over $45,000,-
000. In 1939 the rubber exports of
Indo-China reached a volume equal to
that of the net imports of crude rubber
into France,21 thanks to the paternalistic
attitude of the government inspired by
the desire to emancipate France from de-
pendence upon foreign rubber.
In addition to rubber, French capital-
ists were promoting the cultivation of
tea, coffee, coconuts, sugar cane, and
even cotton.
The main product of Indo-Chinese for-
ests is teakwood, almost a monopoly of
French firms. Rattan, cinnamon, cam-
phor, lacquer, and paper-pulp production
and export were also more or less ex-
clusively in the hands of French entre-
preneurs.
After the depression the French in-
vested roughly somewhat over $3,000,-
000 in mining. Coal played the most
important part in Indo-Chinese mining
investment, next came tin ore, while zinc,
tungsten, and gold shared the third place.
In the field of trade and industry the
French invested almost $11,000,000 be-
tween 1931 and 1938. Their investment
in the cement industry deserves special
mention; Indo-Chinese cement was ex-
ported into all countries of the Far East.
In the last decade public works, elec-
tric power, and building industries con-
siderably expanded, largely owing to
French capital and technical assistance.
French entrepreneur investments in this
field amounted to about $10,000,000
between 1931 and 1938.
Netherlands Indies and British Malaya
In the Netherlands Indies and British
Malaya, French capital remained very
much in the background, and informa-
tion on French holdings is fragmentary.
In the Dutch East Indies the French,
like the Belgians, took a special inter-
est in rubber and oil-palm plantations.
They also had a substantial share in the
Royal Dutch Company. An informed
guess may place French entrepreneur
investments in the Indies at about
$35,000,000.
In Malaya, the French had con-
siderable interests in tin. It is, how-
ever, almost impossible to assess the
value of their holdings at the outbreak
of the present war, because of the
reticence of the interested circles and
the constant changes in the value of the
French franc. In 1923 the four French
companies in this field had a combined
capital of about $650,000. 22 There
were also small French interests in
rubber.
GERMAN INVESTMENTS
German investments in tea and coffee,
oil palm, cinchona, rubber, and industry
amounted to not much more than $10,-
000,000. After the conquest of the
Netherlands in the spring of 1940, the
colonial government took over all Ger-
man property as well as 49 German
agricultural enterprises, 227 German in-
dustrial and commercial establishments,
and 31 other small German businesses.
Not much is known as to whether the
Japanese have returned or intend to re-
turn. that property to their German
brothers-in-arms.
21 Far Eastern Survey, Oct. 11, 1939, p. 234.
22 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-




The Chinese had vast holdings-al-
most exclusively entrepreneur invest-
ments-throughout the whole area. It
is interesting to note that the Chinese
business investments were created with
practically no outpayment from China.
In contrast to the West, it is not the
business corporation but the Chinese
family that undertakes entrepreneur in-
vestments. There were business estab-
lishments in every country in southeast-
ern Asia that were owned and managed
by Chinese families whose home was in
China and who sent out members of
their family generation after generation
to carry on the business. The role of
the family adds to the extraordinary
difficulties of estimating the value of
Chinese holdings in southeastern Asia.
British Malaya
The Chinese made for themselves a
very important place in British Malaya.
Vast sums of money were annually sent
from Malaya to Hong Kong for the sup-
port of family members living in China.
In 1930, for example, such remittances
amounted to about $14,000,000.23 In
the field of business investments in
Malaya, the Chinese were a good second
to the British. Their holdings reached
approximately a total of $200,000,000.
Of late years a large number of
wealthy Chinese put more surplus
money into rubber plantations. The
acreage of Chinese-owned plantations
was constantly on the increase during
the last two decades. Also other agri-
cultural industries, such as the cultiva-
tion of and trade in tapioca and in
areca nuts, pineapple canning, and saw-
milling were partly or entirely in Chi-
nese hands. In addition, the fishing in-
dustry was controlled by the Chinese.
The Chinese had been mining tin in
Malaya long before the British came.
In the years preceding the Japanese
conquest, the output from mines owned
and worked exclusively by Chinese was
about 36 per cent of the total, while an
additional 11 per cent came from land
sublet to Chinese.
In Malaya, where the Chinese consti-
tuted the majority of the merchant class
as they did elsewhere in southeastern
Asia, the retail trade depended entirely
upon Chinese shops.
The Netherlands Indies
It should be expressly mentioned
that in the Netherlands Indies, island-
Chinese investments were not statisti-
cally separated from Dutch holdings.
However, on the basis of other informa-
tion the guess can be made that Chinese
business capital was worth about $150,-
000,000 before the outbreak of the
present war. The Chinese were repre-
sented in practically every branch of
agricultural and industrial endeavor.
They were investors in rubber planta-
tions and in sugar lands and sugar cen-
trals. With regard to trade, the Chi-
nese were the predominant factor in
nearly every port of the islands.
The Philippines
The Chinese were economically per-
haps, and numerically certainly, the
most powerful foreign group in the
Islands. Millions of Filipinos had to
rely upon them for many of the neces-
sities of life. With an investment of
$25,000,000 in the retail trade alone,
predominance of Chinese in this field
was indisputable. The total of their
business investments in the Common-
wealth has been estimated as reaching
$100,000,000. This would place them
in second place (next to the Americans)
among nationals of other countries
doing business in the Islands before the
war.
23 C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China
(New York, 1933), p. 185.
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The Chinese owned not less than 75
per cent of the 2,500 rice mills in the
Islands, and over 10 per cent of the
capital invested in the lumber industry.
In commerce and industry the Chi-
nese were prominent in warehousing
and marketing, shoe making, and the
cordage business. They had a con-
siderable influence in banking. Be-
cause Chinese profits could not be sent
back to China on account of the Sino-
Japanese war, about 50 new corpora-
tions with a capital of $750,000 came
into existence between 1937 and 1939.
It has also been said that a great deal
of money was invested by Chinese in
real estate during that period.
Thailand
Chinese business investments in Thai-
land were very probably equal in
amount to the entrepreneurial invest-
ments of all other foreigners in the
country put together. A conservative
estimate should value them at about
$100,000,000. As in other regions of
southeastern Asia, Chinese in Thailand
owned the rice mills, they cultivated
rubber and sugar cane, and they con-
trolled the fishing industry. They also
were active in the field of mining, espe-
cially tin. In the internal trade as well
as in several smaller home industries,
they occupied an unrivaled position.
Before the Sino-Japanese conflict Chi-
nese remittances from Thailand to
Hong Kong reached an average of five
to six million United States dollars. Its
economic power has made the Chinese
minority a target for national animosi-
ties.
French Indo-China
The Chinese, an exceedingly power-
ful racial minority in French Indo-
China, were, next to European capital-
ists, the leaders in trade and industry.
Here as elsewhere they sent large sums
back to China, though they were re-
ported to reinvest at least part of their
savings and profits in Indo-Chinese
business enterprises. Remer, in his in-
vestigation of Chinese remittances in
1931, placed the funds sent from Indo-
China at 5,000,000 Hong Kong dollars
(1,200,000 United States dollars) .24
An estimate of Chinese business in-
vestments in the colony has never been
attempted, but on the basis of several
known factors it is safe to place the
entrepreneurial investments at roughly
$80,000,000 in 1938.
The Chinese monopolized the entire
rice trade, owned about 90 per cent of
the rice mills, and controlled roughly
half of the wholesale trade in corn, and
a great variety of tropical products. In
rubber production as well as in mining,
however, their importance was much
smaller than in other countries of the
region. As agriculturalists they owned
and worked most of the pepper planta-
tions situated in Cambodia and in
Cochin China on the shores of the Gulf
of Siam. The retail business was also
almost entirely in their hands. They
owned tanneries, sawmills, soap and
match factories, and mechanical work-
shops in the big cities, and played a
prominent role in a number of light in-
dustries.
Buyma
The role of the Chinese was less sig-
nificant in Burma than in other countries
of southeastern Asia. Here he was pri-
marily a shopkeeper or a small trader,
a rice-mill or timber-mill owner, a pawn-
shop or liquor-shop licensee, or an arti-
san. There were a few Chinese-owned
estates, and in the Mergui district some
of the tin was smelted locally by Chi-
nese in small furnaces. Before this war,
Chinese business holdings in the colony
hardly exceeded $14,000,000.





The fact that a part of the Japanese
investment is listed in Filipino names
makes it difficult to assess the value of
Japanese direct investments in the Is-
lands. We know, however, that Japa-
nese holdings have greatly increased in
recent years. An estimate of $25,000,-
000 to $30,000,000 for Japan’s total
entrepreneur investments in the Islands
will be as near to the truth as can be
ascertained on the basis of available in-
f ormation.25
The largest field of Japanese enter-
prise was in abaci cultivation, and be-
fore the war the Japanese controlled both
production and distribution of about one-
third of the abaci output of the Philip-
pines. In addition, Japanese capital was
concentrated in timber lands, coconut
plantations, and, to a smaller degree,
corn and rice cultivation. Altogether,
Japanese holdings in agriculture and for-
estry may be placed at $10,000,000.
The Japanese also had a strong interest
in fishing and canning. 211
Base-metal mining such as manganese
(the Philippine-Nippon Mining Com-
25 Royal Institute of International Affairs,
United Kingdom Memorandum No. 8 &dquo;Capi-
tal Investment in Colonial Territories,&dquo; Inter-
national Studies Conference, Tenth Session,
Paris, 1937.
pany) and copper, also chromium and
iron, attracted Japanese investors. How-
ever, such investments were for various
reasons not always openly made, and are
therefore difficult to assess. Since they
were devised as an instrument for con-
trol of mineral resources, they were
made in the form of not inconsiderable
Japanese &dquo;loans&dquo; to individuals or com-
panies.
In recent years, the installation of
Japanese textile factories in the Islands,
as well as of numerous enterprises for
underwear, hosiery, and cotton, took
place as an economic countermove
against the quota limitation of Japanese
products effected in 1935.
The Netherlands Indies
The earlier investments in the Dutch
East Indies were in sugar, tea, and oil-
palm cultivation, but more recently the
Japanese entered the field of rubber and
oil. The total business investments may
be estimated at $12,000,000 in 1937.
British Malaya
Before the war, Malayan iron was the
most important non-Japanese source of
supply for Japan’s steel industry. Japa-
nese iron production in the three Un-
federated Malay States of Johore, Treng-
ganu, and Kelantan alone was about half
of the Japanese iron ore imports in 1937.
One of the Japanese iron mines in Treng-
ganu is also an important producer of
manganese.
26 Generoso P. Provido, Japanese Interests in
the Philippines (Stanford University, 1936), p.
57.
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